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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHESTER E. FARROW,
Plaintiff and Appellant
VS

HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION,
a corporation, SALT LAKE CLINIC,
a professional corporation,
LOUIS J. SCHRICKER, M.D. and
LOUIS J. MOENCH, M.D.
Defendants and Respondents.:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a malpractice action brought by
Appellant, Chester E. Farrow, against Health Services
Corporation (owner and operator of

t~e

LOS Hospital,

Salt Lake City, Utah); Salt Lake Clinic, Louis J.
Schricker, M.D. and Louis J. Moench, M.D.
Chester E. Farrow entered the LDS Hospital
as a patient of Dr. Louis J. Schricker on the 12th day
of August, 1974.

His initial diagnosis was that of

cervical spondylosis.

He was operated on for this con-

dition on August 15, 1974.
a success.

The operation was, evidently,

However, on returning from the recovery
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room and later while a patient on the neurosurgical
floor of the hospital he became confused and disorientE
and suffered from hallucinations at times.

When the

condition persisted, appellant requested pnyciatric
help from Dr. Schricker.

Dr. Schricker arranged for

a consultation by Dr. Louis J. Moench.

Dr. Moench saw

appellant on the evening of August 23, 1974.

Subsequen

to that visit and during the early morning hours of Aug
24, 1974, appellant broke the window of his room on the
sixth floor of the hospital; jumped through the window
and landed on a roof above the first floor entrance of
the hospital on the west side.

As a result of the fall

and injuries sustained by appellant, he was rendered
permanently paralized and is now quadriplegic.
Appellant claims that the hospital and attend
physicians were negligent in his care, treatment and ca
trol post-operatively; and that his accident would not

have happened had appropriate measures of surveilance m
control been taken by those responsible.
Respondents deny any negligence on their part
and allege further that appellant's fall and injuries
w~re

caused by a suicide attempt .
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The lower court granted sununary judgment
in favor of Dr. Schricker and Health Services Corporation.

The issues against Dr. Moench were tried to a

jury.

From a verdict and judgment for Dr. Moench and

from the sununary judgments, plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgments
in favor of defendants and asks for trial on the merits
against all defendants .
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chester E. Farrow, the plaintiff, was born
December 28, 1924 and resided in Moab, Utah at the time
of this accident.

He received his education in geology

from Okalahoma State University and was working as a
consulting geologist in mineral exploration at the time
of the accident.

His training included work for the

U.S.G.S., Bureau of Reclamation, Atomic Energy Commission,
and Tidewater Oil Company.

He has worked as a consulting

geologist all over the western United States, Australia,
South America, Central America, Canada and West Africa.
Tr. 110-112.
His services were in demand and he earned a
substantial income.

Tr. 184.

In August, 1974, Farrow suffered an accident
involving his 4-wheel drive vehicle.

He was taking a

sack of flour from the vehicle to his home when he struck
his left arm against a mirror bracket on the car.

This

caused a series of spasms in his arm, through his shoulder
and into his neck.
1974.

Tr. 115-116.

This was on a Saturday in August,
He called the local doctor in Moab

and received a prescription but the pain continued and
on Monday he consulted his family doctor.

Tr. 117.

About Wednesday the following week he was hospitalized
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in Moab, Utah for x-rays.

It was suggested by his lac

doctor that he would require additional treatment and
would have to go to Salt Lake City for that purpose.
About August 11, 1974, he came to Salt Lake City, staye
overnight in a motel and was admitted to the LOS Hospit
by Dr. Louis J. Schricker on August 12, 1974.

(Tr. lH

Prior to any operative procedures being performed upon plaintiff he stated both to Dr. Schricker
and the anesthesiologist that he had had a violent reaction to an anesthetic that was given to him in 1949
for an appendectomy.

He advised them that as he was

coming out of the anesthetic he became violent and it
took several people to hold him down.

(Tr. 119)

The first procedure performed upon him after
he entered the hospital was a myelogram which confirmed
the diagnosis of herniated disc at the C5-C6 level.
(Page 36 of Hospital Records, Exhibit "Dl")
On August 15, 1974, Dr. Schricker performed
a laminectomy and discectomy on the cervical spine at
the level indicated.
For a day or two following the operation, pla
tiff had no knowledge of events that occurred to him or
his surroundings.

He did have a recollection, however,

of a mental impression of bizarre events and happenings
that occurred during this period of time that he typif~
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as being hallucinations.

He saw bright lights and people

running as if an atomic blast had occurred.
fear for the safety of his wife and daughter.

He experienced
He ex-

perienced sexual fantasies and had a mental picture of
his home and office being burned down.

(Tr. 124)

After

he became rational, he told Dr. Schricker about these
episodes.

(Tr. 125)
During the course of his post-operative progress,

he first had visual hallucinations and later the hallucinations became auditory in nature.

At times he was lucid

and completely in control of his faculties and emotions.
Then without apparent cause he would begin to hallucinate.
He had no control of these matters, hallucinations would
simply come and go.

(Tr. 125-126)

As time progressed, the hallucinations were
auditory rather than visual and consisted of voices in
the room (he was in a private room at all times).

The

voices were accusatory and derogatory to him and he became very fearful about his own future.
insight into what was happening to him.

He did not have
(Tr. 127) _

On two occasions during lucid moments he asked
Dr. Schricker to change his room.

On one occasion he

asked Mr. Kent Griffiths (a social worker employed by
the hospital) to change his room.

He was never moved.

(Tr. 127)
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The hallucinations continued.

At times the

sensation was very brief; at other times it would last
most of the night.

He had a mental impression that he

was in a psychiatric observation ward and that the voic
were talking about him.

He detected that he was able t

identify one of the voices, that of Dr. Schricker, the
other voices were that of an older man and woman and a
person with a Southern accent but he was unable to iden
those voices.

(Tr. 128-129)

He felt that during his hospital stay the
hallucinations began to be less in frequency but a shor
time before he jumped from the hospital room, the hallu
cinations had definitely increased in intensity.

(Tr.

Mr. Kent Griffiths has been mentioned before.
He was assigned to visit with Mr. Farrow because of cer
tain concerns expressed by plaintiff's wife over the fa
that a gun that Mr. Farrow had at home had been misplac
and she thought he had taken it with him to the hospita
The fact is he did not have a gun.

During his hospital

stay Mr. Griffith became a confidant and the only persu
in the hospital that plaintiff felt at ease with.

(Tr.

The afternoon before the night this terrible tragedy
occurred, Mr. Griffiths had taken plaintiff to the ou~
patio of the hospital and it was one of the only times
during his hospital stay that plaintiff had felt any
(Tr. 139)
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~

By August 23, plaintiff realized that he needed
help.

He asked Dr. Schricker to get him the best psychi-

trist in the City becacse he wanted someone to straighten
him out and provide the proper care.

{Tr. 1369)

To add to the confusion and fear that had occurred to this man, the hospital had lost or misplaced
his money.

Plaintiff customarily carried a fairly large

amount of cash for use in his business of acquiring
mineral options.

When he entered the hospital he had

between three and four thousand dollars cash on his person
which he turned into the hospital on admittance.

He be-

came aware, after the operation, that the hospital could
not produce his money and this fact greatly disturbed him.
(Tr. 1369 - 1370)

The money was eventually found, but

not until after he had jumped from the window.
Returning to the events of this day, plaintiff
returned to his room after his visit with Mr. Griffith
on the hospital patio.
again commenced.

On his return the hallucinations

He had a great deal of anxiety and called

his wife at least twice before he was visited by the
psychitrist, Mr. Moench.

(Tr. 1374)

He was fearful and suspicious of everyone in
the hospital.

He did not contact the nurses about his

condition because he felt they were spies for the voices
that were accusing him and making derogatory _remarks about
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him.

we~

He had the mental impression that the people

going to put him in a mental institution.
Dr. Moench vjsited with him in his hospital
room on the evening of the 23rd.

(Tr. 1376)

The visit by Dr. Moench was a question and
answer period wherein the plaintiff discussed the fact
that he was having marital problems and that he was
greatly concerned about the hallucinations that he was
experiencing.

Plaintiff has no recollection that Dr.

Moench gave him any diagnosis of his problem or that h
said anything about what plaintiff could expect in the
future.

He did try to reassure plaintiff.

Dr. Moench

frightened him by the manner of his questions and
tiff became very anxious after Dr. Moench left.
his wife and expressed that anxiety to her.

pla~

He cal

(Tr. 13791

At the time Dr. Moench left, plaintiff had

e

mental impression that Dr. Moench was talking to someo1
in the hall and that he had stated that they would
to transfer plaintiff to a mental institution.

ha~

(Tr. 13

Whether this was a hallucination or fact plaintiff cou
not tell.

At the time it occurred, he believed it was

true and this created more fear and anxiety.
Some time after eight o'clock as indicated h
called his wife.

He told her to be sure to call him t

next morning by nine-thirty because he felt that someSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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thing was going to happen to him, that he might be moved
and that he was very much afraid.

(Tr. 1380)

The events occurring subsequent to Dr. Moench's
visit can best be described by reference to the actual
testimony of the plaintiff.

Q

Then I want you to discuss with us and tell

us in detal everything that happened to you from that
point up until the time that you went out the window.
A

Well, these audio hallucinations continued

in intensity and frequency.

I was very much afraid.

I

would get into bed; I would lie there a few minutes; I
would get up, walk back and forth around the room, lie
back in bed again trying to rest.

I was very anxious.

I'd get up and pace again.
There was a large chair in the corner of the
room.

I would sit in this for awhile.

I thought that

these people--I heard noises outside the room.
was closed.

I didn't know what was going on.

The door
I thought

that these people were coming to get me, and I didn't
have anything to defend myself with.

I felt that I

couldn't get out that door and get by them.

There was

a bathroom which--

Q

At that point--

A

Yes?
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Q

Had you reached a mental determination of

action on your part?
A

All I wanted to do at that point and ever

since I had talked with Dr. Moench was to get out of tl
room.

And I attempted to go through the bathroom, whii

the other room adjoining me had a door which opened

o~

and I went from my side of the bathroom into the other
man's room.

I heard people talking, heard somebody

cough, and I--it scared me--and I came back in through
the bathroom into the room which I was in.

I made no

further attempt to try to get out through the doorway.
I didn't know what to do.

I kept going back and forth

to bed, getting up and walking around, sitting in the
chair, very much afraid, trying to

fig~re

out what I

could do.
These hallucinations were increasing.

I had

reached a point where I was not sure what I was doing.

Q

Did you know where you were?

A

Not all the time, I didn't.

Part of the

time I thought that I was back in the hospital in Moab.
Q

How many stories does that hospital have?

A

It's only one floor.

Q

Continue.

A

Anyway, this kept going on and on.
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And I

don't recall anyone coming into the room after Dr. Moench
left.

If they did, I have no recollection of it whatso-

ever.
Eventually, the whole thing just got the best
of me.

I took the chair and I broke out the left window

of the room which I was in--it was a plate glass window-I broke it clean so that--

Q

Where did you think you were then?

A

I thought that I was on the ground floor

and that I could just jump out of the window and run.
And that's what I did.

I took and broke the window

clean so that I would not cut myself.

There were no

jagged edges, as I remember, and the only cut that I
received from the glass was a small scar right there.
That's the only place.

Q

Pointing to your left hand?

A

No, it's the right hand.

Q

Excuse me, the right hand?

A

It's right there.

And that's the only cut

that I received from the glass.
I stepped back from the window after I had
broken it out, and I saw a place--and I would guess less
than about 15 seconds, I stepped back from the window
I would say about two paces, and I ran and jumped as if
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were to be hurdling the windowsill.
to do that.

And it's

possi~

I actually put my foot on the windowsill

when I went down.

And as soon as I went out the win&

I knew that--what had happened.
Q

As soon as you left the room, is that corn

A

That's correct.

Q

What did you think right at that moment?

A

I just said, "Oh, my God."

MR. SNOW:

Object to that as self-serving.

THE COURT:
A
face down.

The objection is overruled.

I said, "Oh, my God."

And I was falling

And then I rolled over on my back, and I

landed on my left shoulder and my head on the top of

t

covering of the--it's a walkway, I guess, to the entn
of the hospital.

(Tr. 1381, line 13 - 1383, line 28)

Exhibit 3P is a photograph of the west side
of the LDS Hospital.

At the time of the accident, Ffil

was in a sixth-floor private room.

He jumped from the

window marked with a circle and landed on a roof cover
the first floor entrance to the hospital.

The posit~

of his body is marked with a circle and his name is
written to the side.
a result of the fall.

He did not lose consciousness as
He tried to move both his arms

legs but realized immediately that he was paralyzed.
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was in extreme pain.

Dr. Schricker arrived and climbed

onto the roof while Farrow lay there.
why in the hell did yo~ do it?"
did not know.

He said "Chester,

Farrow replied that he

(Tr. 1385-1386)

Eventually he was removed from the roof by
fireman and taken inside the hospital for treatment.

He

remained in the hospital from his admittance in August
to December 3, 1974.

(Exhibit Pl)

As a result of the

fall he sustained a fractured dislocation of cervical
disc C-5, C-6 and C-7 resulting in severe damage to the
spinal column, resulting in paralysis.

He has had numer-

ous operations and surgical procedures performed upon
him, both at LOS Hospital and later at the VA Hospital
in Long Beach, California.

He is quadreplegic and his

paralysis is permanent.

For a complete understanding of this case, and
the reasons why this medical tragedy occurred and why it
could have been prevented, one must carefully analyze
Farrow's medical record at the LOS Hospital and the testimony of the doctors and nurses and other hospital personnel
who had contact with the plaintiff.

It is the interaction

or rather the lack of interaction between these people
that caused this accident.

Each of those involved either
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failed to carry out their duties or did so in a superficial and negligent manner.
The following factual survey will deal with
te~

the facts contained in the hospital record and the
mony of the personnel as these events unfold.

Examining the hospital records, the Court is
asked to note that each sheet bears a penciled number
usually in the lower right-hand corner.

The hospital

practice when a patient is discharged from the

hospit~

is to send the hospital record to the records librarim
At that time a clerk numbers each page serially.

Thee

sheets in this record that are not numbered are "physic
order sheets for August 15, 1974 through August 24, 19:
involving three separate sheets.

These are now

between numbered sheets 48 and 49.

locat~

The unnumbered shee

were missing from the first copies of hospital records
obtained by plaintiff's attorneys but were later obtair
from counsel for the hospital.

No explanation has beer

offered as to why these sheets are unnumbered or why tr
were not with the other records for some period of time
The first indication given to the defendants
in this case that there might be a potential problem

~

when plaintiff entered the hospital and advised Dr.
Schricker and the anesthesiologist of the bad reaction
he had had years earlier from anesthetic given during
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an appendectomy.

This is noted on page 85 of the Record

made by Dr. Lee Learned the anestheologist.

The conver-

sation was vaguely recalled by Dr. Schricker.

(Tr. 1314)

Clearly the doctors were put on notice of a potential
problem.
After the operation a problem did develop.
Plaintiff became confused, disoriented and depressed.
This is reflected in the hospital records and particularly
those notations made in the progress notes and the bedside clinical sheets signed by the nurses.

We take this

from the 16th of August, 1974 which was the day Farrow
was taken from the intensive care unit to a private room
on the neurosurgical floor.

AUGUST 16, 1974
PROGRESS NOTE

NURSES NOTE - BEDSIDE
CLINICAL

Transfer oul of ICU when
bed is available. Doing
well.
Maybe sl. confusion
(signed) Schricker.

8:30 p.m. Resting quietly
10:30 Resting quietly.

AUGUST 17, 1974
PROGRESS NOTE

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Some confusion this evening.
Neck is "good".
Some fulness but not unexpected.
Good spirits.
(signed)
Schricker.

12:00 a.m. Alert and
oriented. Further note, has
difficulty turning c/o discomfort in arms when on side.
States wife and six-year old
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August 17, 1974
Continued
BEDSIDE CLINICAL (Cont;
daughter were here at (
Refused breakfast at t
stated he was going to
(operating room) alert
oriented.
AUGUST 18, 1974
PROGRESS NOTE

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Quite confused during the
night and is not oriented
fully.
Wife told nurse
during the night that this
is not unusual for him that
it had been going on for
several months. Calmed
down a bit at present.
(signed)
Schricker.

4: 0 0 a. m. Resting quiE
in bed.
7:00 to 3:00 Eating1
agitated at times, re~
quietly at other times.
4:00 p.m. Walked inh
and complains of left '
being numb and tingly,
pain in shoulders, gr~
Confused at times.

AUGUST 19, 1974
PROGRESS NO'I::::

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Still remains moderately confused but less combative.
Left arm feels good except
for some numbness in left
index finger.
(signed)
Schricker

12:00 a.m.
asleep.

Appears to

4:00 to 6:00
most of Noc.
7:40

Asleep

Alert, awake

8: 30 c/o pain TL noti
10:00 Resting
11:30 Resting TL notif
patients request for W
relaxant
1: 00 Resting, having
pain, talking on phone
.16.
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August 19, 1974
Continued
BEDSIDE CLINICAL (Continued)
4:00 Chilly - asked for
pain med.
6:00 Nauseated
6:45 Up to BR
8:00 Asked for milk
9:00 Cooperative
10:00 Had a carton of milk
No special problems
AUGUST 20, 1974

PROGRESS NOTE

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Much more oriented today and
wondering what has gone on
the past few days.
Is concerned about his wife. Neck
is soft and pliable. Good
progress.
(signed) Schricker

12:00 to 1:00 a.m.
to be asleep

Appears

2:00 Awake c/o that he
can't sleep
4:00

Appears to be asleep

6:00 A fairly restful night
frequently stiring.
8:00 Complaint of losing
watch. Would like to get
envelope from downstairs.
c/o bad headache. Seems
to be feeling better. Visiting.
4:00 p.m. Appears depressed.

AUGUST 21, 1974
PROGRESS NOTE

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Doing better today. Daughter
an c wife are here and he is
very happy today.
(signed)
Schricker

12:00 a.m.
asleep.
4:00
7:00
10:00

Appears to be

Appears to be asleep.
Resting
Family in to visit.
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August 21, 1974
Continued

PROGRESS NOTE (Continued)

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Dr. Schricker! Can we con. sider a psych consult on this
pt?
(signed) Kent Griffith
Yes!
(writing of Dr.
Schricker)

(Cont~

12:00 p.m. Appears
table. Sleeping.

co~

8: 00 Up ad lib.
Seem:
oriented and quiet. No
plaints.

AUGUST 22, 1974
PROGRESS NOTE

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Much clearer! Doing well
ambulating. (signed)
Schricker

12:00 a.m. Asleep at lm
intervals during noc.
7:00 - 8:00 Awake, no
complaints. Awaiting wi
and friend.
12:00 p.m. Patient
cooperative.
3:00

ve~

A quiet day.

4:00 Up ad lib.
inn
and in hall. No compl~
8:00 Made ready for tl
night.
AUGUST 23, 1974
PROGRESS NOTE

BEDSIDE CLINICAL

Has asked for psychiatric
help today for the first
time.
Neurologically he
is doing quite well.
(signed) Schricker

12:00 a.m. Appears
asleep.

to~

4:00 - 6:00 Asleep mo~
8: 00 Patient claims tha

does not feel well .
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August 23, 1974
Continued
PROGRESS NOTE (Continued)

BEDSIDE CLINICAL (Continued)

Dr. Moench contacted and
will see patient this evening. He is clear and well
oriented, seems happier
today.
(signed) Schricker.

2:00 p.m. Patient feels very
tired. No pain at the moment.
Good day.
4:00 Up ad lib.
plaints

No com-

6:00 Dr. Moench here
8:00 Resting quietly.
10:00 Backrub given, made
ready for the night.
AUGUST 24, 1974
BEDSIDE CLINICAL
12:00 a.m. Spoke to patient
states he is o.k. Offers
no complaint.
Instructed
to call nurse if he should
need anything.
1:30 Checked patient.
Seemed asleep.
2:40 Upon hearing loud crash
while in 611 I entered 607
patient was not in bed, I
turned on light and was that
window was broken. Upon looking out window was what appeared to be Mr. Farrow lying
on 2nd floor roof. Nursing
supervisor (F. Blood) notified
administrator of nursing and
nursing administration notified Dr. Schricker and Moench
notified .

• 19.
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The Progress Note and nurses notes have

be~

set forth in detail here for several days following th
operation until the moment he jumped from the window.
Significantly, we find that the psychiatric social wm
Mr. Griffith, felt concerned enough about this patient
put a note in the chart requesting a psychiatric

cons~
~.

He emphasized his request with exclamation points.

Schricker responded by placing an exclamation point aft
the word "yes".

Note also, the following day where Dr.

Schricker places an exclamation point after the words
"Much clearer!"

(There appears to be a little bit

of~

fessional pride involved here.)
Dr. Moench saw Farrow on the evening of the;
at about 6: 00 p. m.
port at 8:00 p.m.
hospital record.

He completed his examination and re
The report is on pages 68 and 69 of
It is reproduced here.
Age 49.

Patient is a geologist from Moab who
had a recent injury and operation for
cerv - disc. Following, he has had marked
and repid swings in mood, in contact with
with reality, has fluctuated between
cooperation and compliance and combative,
suspicious hostility.
At present he is very tense, says he
hears voices of 2 to 4 persons - in hall
and ceiling, talking about (not to) him,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.20.

keeping him under surveilance, accusing
him of being a sex fiend, etc. etc.
Tells of prolonged marital problems,
of lack of problem-solving skills (bilateral), of periods of tension over finances, and esp. recently when his work
pressures are high. Had 2 counselling
sessions but felt that he was cast as the
villain, so he didn't continue. Has
enjoyed and appreciated his visits (with)
Mr. Griffith. Was esp. appreciative of
a visit off the ward, where the surveilance doesn't follow.
Imp

=

1. Long term marital maladjust
2. Present episode is either a
dissociative reaction or a paranoid schizophrenic reaction. His tension is very
high; his anxiety level very high; his
distortion of reality may lead to acts
of poor judgment.
Suggest: 1. A phenothiazine med. in
fairly large doses promptly (I'll take the
liberty of ordering) .
2. Avoid barbiturates, if
possible.
3. Repeated reassurance by
direct nurse contact (nurse entering room,
standing by bed, while talking).
4.
If aud. hallucinations
don't subside promptly, may have to move
to 3 North (psychiatric ward) for safety. *
s. Continue marital counseling (with) Mr. Griffiths.
Thanks
L. G. Moench
23 Aug 74
20:00 hours

*

The words "psychiatric ward" added for clarity •
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The foregoing factual summary protrays this
medical tragejy.

First, from the mental impressions

plaintiff and then from the record as set forth by th
attending psysician, the psychiatrist and the nurses,
From this impression, it is apparent that Mr. Farrow.
a very sick and very disturbed person.
As the points of argument unfold the testh
of other witnesses in the case will be discussed ind
tail as it pertains directly to the elements of liabi
POINT I:

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMEN
TO DEFENDANT LOUIS J. SCHRICKER, M.D. AND
HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION (LDS HOSPITAL)
On August 29, 1977, the day before this tri

was to begin, motions for summary judgment were arguei
by Health Services Corporation and Louis J. Schricker
Cross-motions by plaintiff against the defendants wer
filed and argued by the plaintiff.

To the

astonis~!

of practically everyone involved in this case, the

~

granted summary judgment to Louis J. Schricker, MD an1
Health Services Corporation.
The evidence before the court at the time
simply did not warrant summary judgment.

Considered<

it must be, in a light most favorable to the losing P
(plaintiff) , the evidence clearly shows a genuine is8
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of fact for determination by the jury.
The lower court either chose to ignore or
completely failed to understand the testimony of the
witnesses.
The court had before it at the time of the
motion the deposition of Dr. Sydney Walker, a psychiatrist practicing in La Jolla, California.

The deposi-

tion was taken by the attorneys representing the defendants.

The testimony of Dr. Walker is as follows:

Transcript 765:

Q. That is a generalized statement. I would
like you to now tell me precisely, based on your review
of this record, what the nursing staff of the LDS Hospital
failed to do in the treatment of this patient.
A.
I feel they failed to recognize the emotional problem, in terms of this man's acute toxic psychosis, number one, and then to exercise the care of
watching him prior to, during and after the time of the
psychiatric evaluation.
Transcript 767:

Q. Is it your statement that their failure to
require the doctors, after they have called this situation
to the doctors' attention, is a failure on their part to
meet an accepted medical standard?
A.

Yes, it is.

The testimony following has to do with the fact
that the hospital social worker (an employee of the hospital)
noted the psychiatric condition of Farrow and brought it
to the attention of Dr. Schricker.

However, it was two
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days later that Dr. Schricker acted and it was not

w

later that night that the psychiatrist finally appea:
The testimony concerning this event is found at Tr"

Q. All right. He called this to the at~
of the doctor on the 21st. On the 23rd the doctor,'
treating physician, does call in a psychiatrist for:
psychiatric evaluation.
Is it your position that t~
social worker or the supervising nurses should have'
these doctors react more swiftly than they did?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And they have the authority and

A.

They certainly do.

contr~

of that?

Q.
So they are supposed to diagnose the ac
ness of this patient and then tell the doctor what ~

A.
I am not asking for them to make a dim
They are responsible for taking inunediate action.
If this man should come into the emergency
without an airway open and one doctor doesn't open tr
airway, it is necessary for the staff to get a doctor
that will open the airway.
Q. Let's stay with the facts.
We have g~
a patient that is disoriented and it appears to thel
ees of thE hospital maybe he needs a psJchiatric ex~
tion.
It is your position, your professional posit~
now as an expert in the case, that the failure of thl
hospital to insist that Dr. Schricker act more swift!
than he did is a failure of the hospital to sustaina
cepted medical practice?
A.

Yes.

The doctor testified that the hospital fail
to move the patient to the psychiatric ward,

Tr. 80(

that the hospital had responsibility in regard to the
medication given, Tr. 801 - 802; and on the assumpt~
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that the nursing care given after the visit by Dr.
Moench was merely normal and routine, the hospital would
be guilty of negligence.

Q. Assume, doctor, after he (Moench) visited
the patient that the nurses only made routine and normal
checks and did nothing else. Would you consider that
to be an act of negligence on the part of the hospital?
A.

Yes.

His testimony is best summed up in a letter
to counsel which is contained in the transcript at page
846:
"In conclusion, it would appear that Mr. Farrow's
acute psychotic reaction when unidentified by the hospital
personnel or attending physicians who, if they had taken
appropriate measures for diagnosis and correction of the
situation, would have avoided the patient's catastrophic
actions."
The deposition of Dr. Walker must be considered
by the Court in its entirety so that the full panoply
of medical thought will be evident.
the doctor

~nd

The negligence of

hospital is apparent from this testimony

alone and precludes the granting of summary judgment.
There is much additional evidence.
Frances Funk, R.N.
Frances Funk was an expert witness for the
plaintiff.

Her deposition was taken by the hospital and

was before the Court for the motion for summary judgment.
Mrs. Funk had been a long-time employee of the LDS Hospital

.25.
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and was retired at the time.

She was at the hospital

during the week that the accident to Farrow occurred
was aware that he had been a problem patient.
Page 43.)

(Depos

Significant portions of her testimony fol}

Page 29.
Q.
So the psychiatric problem was noted, w
known, and was called to the attention of the doctor;
isn't that right?

A. That's right and that is why it seems t'
me that the nurses should have certainly been aware t
this patient needed closer observation and needed m~
help.
Page 32.
A.
I think they were aware of this
problem from the time he was admitted.

patie~

Page 51.
Q.
In your opinion there was nothing given
this man other than routine care; is that correct?

A.

Routine custodial care.

Q.
Given the circumstances of Dr. Moench's
visit, would appropriate nursing care in this case h~
dictated that this man be restrained?

A. Yes, and not being a psychiatric nurse,
would-- (objections)
The Witness: Let me finish.
I would want:
be very careful how I observe that patient.
Q.
If I have that correctly, then, without
being a psychiatric nurse, but being an RN.

A.

Right.

Page 53.
Q. And does this record indicate to you, tl
nurse's record, that this man was given the surveillm
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and observation that Dr. Moench recommended?
A

No.
NOTE

A most significant element relating to the

liability of the hospital is the medication ordered by
Dr. Moench.

Had it been given when ordered and in the

correct dosages this tragedy could have been prevented.
Dr. Moench ordered 100 milligrams of Mellaril "stat"
(meaning "right now") at eight o'clock p.m.

The medica-

tion was not actually given until ten o'clock p.m.
(See medical record.)
On this very important note, Mrs. Funk testified as follows:
Deposition Page 45.
Q When a doctor given an order stat, what
does that mean to a nurse? What is the meaning of that?
What must they do?
A

It means it is supposed to be done immediately.

Q Now, if an order is issued at 8:00 stat for
100 milligrrnas of Mellaril and it is given at 10:00 p.m.,
is that compliance with the doctor's order?

A

No.

Deposition Page 46.

Q.

Should prescriptions have been given im-

mediately?
A.

Yes, it should have •
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Q. And is that also one of your areas ofc
cern here concerning this man's care?
A.

Yes.

Mary E. Vaughn, RN
Mary E. Vaughn's deposition was before
Court on motion for summary judgment.

t~

Mrs. Vaughn he

been an RN since 1942 and for 24 years, to 1974, she
was night supervisor at the LDS Hospital.

Althoughr

a supervisor at the time, she was on duty at the
the night Mr. Farrow jumped from the window.

ho~

Aftert

accident Mrs. Vaughn talked to Diane Karren (the nurs
duty at the time of the accident) .

This was Diane

~

first night on duty after coming off of vacation.

~

not read the chart or the consultation note of Dr.

~

before this tragic event.

From the deposition at pag

20:
" ... Oh, by the way, that ~ight Diane Karrm
told me that this patient had been restrained previm
to this night that he went out the window and he had
up in the halls walking around but this is while she
was on vacation, she told me."
Deposition Page 11.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether tl
nurses performed and did the things that they were ~
posed to do that evening or didn't do what they were
supposed to?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You have that opinion?
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A.

I have my own opinion

Q.

It is a personal opinion?

A.

It is my own opinion.

Q. What areas do you have in mind with reference to that opinion?
A. Well, after being supervisor that many
years, I was always concerned about the safety of the
hospital.

Q.

What do you mean by the safety of the

hospital?
A. Well, you are always thinking for the safety
of the patient and the safety of the hospital.
Q. But do you have an area where you think that
the nurses may not have done everything they were supposed
to have done that evening?
A. Well, with a patient like Mr. Farrow, I
would have said that he should have been posied or had a
restraint on, especially after Dr. Moench had been in
at eight o'clock that evening. That was quite a late
time to be going in to see a patient on consultation.

Q.

Okay.

Define for the record what you mean

by posied.
A.
It is a belt that goes around them and
ties them ~nd they have locked ones and they have ones that
do not lock around their waist.
Her further testimony was to the effect that
the nurse on duty had not read the consultation report of
Dr. Moench and that she stated to Mrs. Vaughn that had she
read it she would have taken other changes (measures?),
Page 42.

Farrow was awake at midnight and should have

been asleep if he had had 100 milligrams of Mellaril,
Page 42.

While she did not expect the nurse to be con-
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stantly in Farrow's room, she did expect that them
would do more than just open the door and look in.

nurse on duty should liave assured herself that Farr(

was sleeping and not merely open the door and look :
Tr. 74.
Again, nurse Vaughn also stated that when
doctor makes an order "stat" it means immediately.
67.
The Court is again directed to the matter
medication.

On the 10th day of September, 1975, bo1

the deposition of Craig Jackson, a pharmisist at

t~

Hospital, and Karen Pool, the nurse on duty when Dr
Moench visited, were taken.

Mr. Jackson was asked

give the particulars as to how the prescription for
Mellaril would have been filled.

The doctor ordere1

100 milligrams stat and then 50 milligrams every fo1
hours and as needed.

Mellaril comes in several amo1

from 15 milligrams to 200 milligrams and the tablet:
are different colors for different amounts.

Tr. 97:

Customarily, with a prescription such as was given

Farrow, the pharmicist would put twelve 50 milligrru
tablets to fill the 100 milligram prescription and

1

thereafter would give one tablet to fill the 50 mil:
gram prescription.

Tr. 969 .
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Nurse Karen Pool who gave the medication testified
as follows:

Tr. 1029.

Q.

How many pills did you give him?

A.

One.

Q.

One?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he take that pill?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you sure?

A.

Yes.

A very curious thing occurred after this
deposition was taken.

At the time this deposition was

signed by Miss Pool, almost one year later, on the 23rd
day of August, 1976, she changed her testimony, gave no
reasons therefor and it now reads as follows:

up by the

Q.

How Many pills did you give him?

A.

One or two, depending on the dosage sent
KP

~harmacy.

Q.

One?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he take that pill?

A.

Yes, if a 100 mg pill was sent up.

KP

This young, inexperienced nurse (at most
three months out of nursing school, and not yet an RN)
gave Farrow only one-half the Mellaril dosage prescribed
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By Dr. Moench.

Negligence on the part of the hospit

is proven and corroborated by nurse Vaughn in her de
sition when she states that Farrow should have been
asleep at midnight (he was not) if he had been given
milligrams of Mellaril at 10:00 p.m.

(Mellaril is a

major tranquilizer.)
A mistake in medication had been made andt
hospital knew it as soon as the two depositions were
taken.

The result-- the nurse changed her testimony

gave no reasons therefor.
This is so patently offensive that the lo•
court should have ignored the testimony change on

t~

motion for sununary judgment.
Further on the matter of medication.
August 23, medication order of Dr. Moench is as

The
fol~

"Mellaril 100 mg stat.
50 mg qid and prn
Dalmane 30 mg hs prn. D/C Nembutal."
Dr. Moench finished his work and left the hospital
8:00 p.m.

He talked to nurse Pool before he left.

~

I

find, however, that nurse Pool did not acknowledge th:
prescription order until 8:50 p.m., almost one hour li
Referring to the medication chart, we find that shed
not give the Mellaril to Farrow until 10: 00 p .m.
is no explanation for this delay.

The:

Simply stated, wher

a doctor gives an order "stat" meaning that it shouN
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carried out immediately, there is absolutely no excuse
for a two hour delay.

Had the medication,been given

timely the tragic accjdent to Farrow would have been
avoided.
That is not all the evidence of negligence relating to medication.

The only medication given Farrow

after the visit of Dr. Moench was the half dosage of
Mellaril.

That was given at 10:00 p.m.

He was to have

50 milligrams at least every four hours and even more
if it was needed.
a.m.

He jumped out of the window at 2:40

Obviously, the nurses should have given him more

Mellaril by at least 2:00 a.m.

Additionally, Dr. Moench

ordered 30 milligrams of Dalmane (a sleeping pill) at
bedtime and as needed.

The sleeping pill was never given.

Mr. Farrow was awake at midnight according to the note
made by the LPN (hospital record, page 208).

Dr. Moench

obviously wanted Mr. Farrow tranquilized and asleep for
that night.

Had the nurses carried out his orders (which

they did not do) this tragedy would have been avoided.
In addition to the medication ordered by Dr.
Moench, he made a further directive to the hospital staff.
On page 69 of the hospital records, he states:

" Q) Repeated reassurance by direct nurse
contact (nurse entering room, standing by
bed while talking)."
Nurse Pool was familiar with this order at the
time it was written by Dr. Moench.

Tr. 1027.

Nurse
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Pool testified that she gave Farrow a pill at lO:OOr
This was noted in the hospital chart.

She testified

she saw him again at 11:00 p.m. as she was going off
duty.

In a three-hour period she visited his room b

This is hardly the frequent contact ordered by Dr.

~

The LPN on duty at the time visited Farrow's room at
10:00 and said she saw him on another occasion.

Ho*

the only visit that is charted is the 10:00 p.m.

vi~

At 11:00 p.m. a shift change occurred at tl
hospital.

Nurse Pool and LPN Callahan turned the fk

over to nurse Diane Karren and LPN Judy Hall. The dij
of Diane Karren was before the court at the time oft
motion for summary judgment.

She worked three days

a week for the hospital and this was her first shift
a two-week vacation.

Tr. 1052.

Her only knowledge

Mr. Farrow was gained from nurse Karen Pool who precE
her on duty.

She was told that Dr. Moench had beeni

and that he had requested that Mr. Farrow be watched.
Tr. 1057.

According to Diane Karren, the number of n

on a ward depended upon the type of patient on the fl
Nurse Karren and LPN Hall were the only two on dutya
11:00 p.m.

(Except for the personnel in the intens~

care unit, and they were not involved with the pati~
on the floor.)

At times, there were three people on

duty on the neuro floor depending upon the nature of
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patients.

When asked about this, nurse Karren responded

that a third person would be needed if someone had to be
watched extra closely, that you could not trust.

Farrow

was such a person and this was apparent from the consultation note of Dr. Moench:

Tr. 1056-57

"His tension is very high; his anxiety
level very high; his distortion of reality
may lead to acts of poor judgment."
It was usually the responsibility of the afternoon shift
to request additional help.

Tr. 1057.

The night shift

could demand extra help but sometimes they would get it
and sometimes not.

Tr. 1057.

busy night on that floor.

Furthermore, this was a

There is space for 22 patients

and the floor was virtually full on that evening.
1048 - 1050 - 1063.

Tr.

A need for extra help existed but

help was never requested.
During the very critical period of time when
something could have been done for Mr. Farrow, nursing
care completely failed.

From 11:00 p.m. until 2:40 a.m.,

u period of about four hours, Farrow was visited only
once and that was by the LPN and not by the registered
nurse.

At 1:30 a.m. nurse Karren did open the door to

Farrow's room and look in, but she did not know whether
he was asleep.

Tr. 1061-62.

This hardly complies with

the "direct nurse contact ordered by Dr. Moench.

Tr.

1273.
"I suggested also that their checking on him
included
them going into his room and not
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just looking through the door, to go to hl
bedside, to identify themselves, and to
ask how he was, and to ask if he needed
anything."
The subject of medication also came up in·
deposition of nurse Karren.

She testified as

foll~

Tr. 1062.

Q. Do you recall if he had any medicatioo
take that night?
A.

That I had to give him?

Q.

Yes.

A.

No.

Q.

You say he did not, or you don't rec al

A.

No, I didn't have any.

Q.

No order for medication?

A.

No.

No.

As pointed out in detail above, both Mella:
and Dalmane had been ordered for Farrow and shouldh
been giver to him by nurse Karren.
any medication order existed.

Yet, she denies:

Unbelievable!

From the record it must be concluded that!
·schricker and the hospital are liable.
an issue of liability is present.

At the very

Dr. Schricker, th

attending physician, failed to heed the fact that ~
told him that he had had a bad reaction to a prior'
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cation (anesthesia); failed to move Farrow from the room
he was in, although it had been requested; failed to
recognize that Farrow had become psychotic after the
operation; and failed to secure the assistance of a
specialist until too late.

(The record will show that

Dr. Schricker took no action on the matter until it was
demanded by a social worker and then a specialist was not
summoned until over two days later.)

Had he responded

promptly as he should have, this tragedy would have been
avoided.
The negligence of the hospital results from an
impressive catalog of failures and omissions:
1.

When the hospital personnel knew that Mr.

Farrow needed psychiatric help they were obligated to
step in and do something about it when the attending
physician failed to act.

Darling v Charleston Conununity

Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill 2d 326, 211 NE2d 253, 14 ALR
3d 860;
2.

Failure to change his room when he requested

to be moved;
3.

Provided only routine custodial care when

much more care was indicated;
4.

Failure to provide surveillance or restraint

and direct nurse contact when indicated and ordered by
Dr. Moench;
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5.

Failure to take reasonable steps to

p~

Farrow from "acts of poor judgment";

6.

Failed to provide extra personnel when:

nurses knew that Farrow was a patient that needed to!
watched;
7.

Delayed two hours in giving Farrow rnefu

tion that had been ordered "stat" and then -dos~

8.

Gave only one-half the prescribed

9.

Failed to give the sleeping medication.

and then

ordered; and
10.

Totally ignored the medication order af

10:00 p.m.

A case of striking resemblance to this one
the Kentucky case of Lexington Hospital, Inc. vs
245 SW2d 927.
epilepsy.

~il

In that case the plaintiff suffered fi

After an epileptic seizure he would have

paranoid delusions imagining he was in a German

pri~

with spies all around and without warning would rune
and hide.

The hospital knew of his anxiety symptoms

paranoid delusions when he was admitted.
admitted, he did in fact escape one time.

After hewa
(It will t

recalled that the hospital records and nurse Pool's 1
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mony reflect the fact that Farrow was found wondering
and confused in the hall of the LDS Hospital.)
day following the

esc~pe,

On the

the attendants left the plaintiff

unattended and unwatched.

He went into a bathroom,

smashed the window and fell to a sidewalk two stories
below.

The Court held that:
"In the present case the defendant had
recognized in its written contract the
need of restraint of the patient. It had
been expressly advised of his sudden and
intermittent fits of aboration and of
his trait to flee in his delirium.
It
had let the patient get away a few days
before, so received adequate warning
from its own experience. This emphasized
the need of special care and protection
to prevent a recurrence.
Despite all
this, the patient had been left alone without surveillance long enough to enter
another room, break out the window and
fall to the ground."
Verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
Another case in close parallel is that of E. W.

Misfeldt v Hospital Authority of the City of Marietta,
115 SE2d 244 (Ga.)

Plaintiff's_ wife was admitted to the

hospital with the diagosis of paranoid schizophrenia.
From the opinion:
"The case, construed in favor of the plaintiff, thus presents us with the tragic results
of divided responsibility. The physician in
charge felt he had made plain to the hospital authorities that the patient was mentally disturbed, and, being on the hospital
staff, he undoubtedly supposed that such a
patient would at no time be left to her own
devices contrary to hospital regulations •
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The admissions clerk felt she had represented the case to the superintendent of
admissions if anything too strongly, because she received a rebuke from that
source at her specific indication of the
"psycho room." The superintendent contended she was not told the patient might
become violent, that her appearance was
normal, and that she accordingly awaited
further instructions from the director of
nurses.
The director never entered the
picture. The floor nurse relied upon any
lack of special instructions to herself ~
guard the patient, and, as to the mediciM,
she contended that the words on the prescription "Q.I.D." instead of "stat" indicated to her that there was no reason for
prompt medication, but only that the medicines, after they were obtained, would be
administered in routine fashion.
[4]
From the above there can be no
doubt but that there was some evidence, at
least, to sustain the allegations of negl~
gence. The hospital did have notice of t~
patient's mentally distrubed condition, a~
it ~annot be said as a matter of law that
they were freed from responsibility becauR
this notice was not in writing contained in
the specific instructio~s brought to them
by the patient's husband at the physician's
request.
There was enough evidence as to
the patient's appearance on arrival to make
a jury issue as to whethe~ trained staff
members should not then have recognized
her irresponsible condition. They did not,
rightly or wrongly, keep constant watch
over her, and they did allow her to wander
away by herself. The particular tranquilizer on which the physician undoubtedly r~
lied should have been given at the regular
4 p.m. administration of medicine. Wheth~
had it been sent for in time, it would
have been available for that purpose, and
whether the delay in sending for it cons ti-.
tuted negligence, were also jury questions.
The Court ruled that the lower court did ~
cmruni t error in failing to direct a verdict for the d
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fendant.

Accidents such as occurred to the plaintiff
in this case are not that rare and unusual.
similar cases are reported on 70 ALR 2d 347.

Many
A good

summary of law is stated on page 348 of that annotation.
"The ordinary rule that the duty of a
hospital toward its patients is to exercise such reasonable care for their safety
as their known mental and physical condition may require, and that in a proper
case this duty may extend to affording
reasonable protection against self-inflicted
injury, has frequently been recognized in
actions for injury or death to a patient
alleged to have resulted from his escape
or attempt to escape."
See also, Kent v Whitaker, 364 P2d 556,

(Wash.);

Vistica v Presbyterian Hospital and Medical Center, 432
P2d 193 (Cal. App.); Wood v Samaritan Institution, Inc.,
161 P2d 556 (Cal.); Hunt v King County, 481 P2d 593
(Wash.); Meier v Ross General Hospital, 445 P2d 519 (Cal.)
(Approving the doctrine of res ispa loquitur in similar
cases.)
The evidence before the court on motion for
summary judgment was that the hospital knew that Mr.
Farrow was suffering from hallucinations; that he was
confused; had wandered in the hall; and that a psychiatric
consultation was needed.

Then when the psychiatrist

finally arrived the nurse read his note while he was
making it and would know that "his tension was very high;
his anxiety level was very high; his distortion of reality
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may lead to acts of poor judgment" and "if aud. hall
cinations don't subside promptly, may have to movet
3 North (psychiatric

~ard)

for safety."

The failure to provide restraint, surveill
and medication for the plaintiff is detailed above.
Additionally, the testimony of the experts convictt
hospital of negligence.

At the very least, the

li~

of the hospital was a question to be submitted to lli
jury.

The summary judgment is not, and should no:
a favorite of the law.

It deprives a litigant of hi:

right to a trial before a court or jury.

It should'

granted only with great reluctance and only then if
clearly appears that the party against whom the
would be
recover.

g~anted

jud~

cannot possibly establish a right t

Rule 56 has given rise to more litigation

and appellate practice than any of the other rules ~
civil procedure.

A recent statement of the court u

tive to summary judgment is set forth in the case of
~s

McGovern, 551 P2d 1266:
"However, inasmuch as the party moved
against is being defeated without the
privilege of a trial, the court should
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carefully scrutinize the 'submissions'
and contensions he makes thereon to see
if his contensions and proposals as to
proof of material facts, resolved in his
favor, would entitle him to prevail;
and if it so appears, the motion for
summary judgment should be denied and
the trial should be had for the purpose
of resolving the disputed issues of fact
and determine the rights of the parties."
For other statements of the Rule see Brandt
vs Springville Bank & Company, 10 Utah 2d 350 353 P2d
460; Tanner vs Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-op, 11 Utah 2d
353 359 P2d 18.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.43.

POINT II:

THE JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS UPON THE VE~:
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S IN~
WAS FORESEEABLE AND DEFENDANTS HAD A DUTY
TO PROTECT HH1 FROM THAT RISK.
The LDS Hospital Progress Notes

(Defenda~

Exhibit 1) on the plaintiff reveal a marked patternt
mental instability.

Dr. Schricker noted on August

and 19 the plaintiff was confused.

l~

On the 20th, Kent

Griffiths, M.S.W., noted that a long discussion with
plaintiff revealed an "extensive history of personal
and marital difficulties ... "

and that, "his

confus~

seems to revolve around the lack of any consistent me
to the significant relationships in his life."

On~

21, Mr. Griffiths asked Dr. Schricker to consider a"
consult" on the plaintiff.
answered, "Yes!"

To this request, Dr.

Sc~

On August 22, Mr. Griffiths wrote i

the notes that there were definitely problems that "n
psychiatric, if not other forms of counseling."

On A.

23, the plaintiff himself asked for psychiatric help.
That evening the plaintiff was visited by Dr. Moench.
LDS Hospital "Report of Consultation" signed by Dr. Mt
at 8:00 p.m., August 23, stated that:
"At present he (the plaintiff) is very te~
says he hears voices of 2 to 4 persons -- iI
hall + ceiling, talking about (not to) him,
keeping him under surveillance, accusing hir
of being a sex fiend, etc., etc.,"
Dr. Moench then entered his impressions, "2 .
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Present eppisode is either a dissociative Reaction or a
Paranoid schizophrenic reaction.

His tension is very

high; his distortion of reality may lead to acts of poor
judgment."; and suggestions "4.

If aud. Hallucinations

don't subside promptly may have to move to 3 North for
safety."

3 North is the psychiatric ward of LDS Hospital.

Six hours later, Chester E. Farrow went out the window
of his room on the sixth floor of LDS Hospital.
At the trial the court read the following
instruction to the jury:
"If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff intentionally
jumped from the window in an attempt to
commit suicide, he is not entitled to
recover from defendants, and you must find
against him, and for the defendants, no
cause of action." Trial 483.
The thrust of this instruction is that a psychiatrist who has undertaken to care for a patient with
notice that he has severe psychiatric problems that may
lead to acts of poor judgment, has no duty to protect
that person from those acts of poor judgment.
This is not the law in other states and should
not be the law in Utah.

"Those charged with the care and

treatment of a patient, who know of facts from which it
might reasonably be concluded that a patient would be
likely to harm himself in the absence of preclusive
measures, must use reasonable care to prevent such harm."
Meier vs. Ross General Hospital, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903, 445
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P2d 519, 525.

(1968).

Also see Fleming v Prince

George's Countv, 277 Md. 655, 358 A2d 892 (1976).
The trial court's instruction would have
been proper had the defendant been a layman.

"Gen-

erally, courts are reluctant to impose civil

liabil~

for another's act of suicide.
the following paradox.

This is partly due to

'If suicide is a deliberatei

tentional act by an individual how can one person be
civilly liable for causing the suicide of another?'"
Note, the Liability of Psychiatrists for

Malpracti~,

University of Pittsburg Law Review, 108, page 110. f
the defendant is not a layman--he is a doctor holdinc
himself out as a specialist in the disorders of the!
mind.

His patients rely on his specialized skill anc

training and he holds a position of trust regarding
their well-being.

"In the psychiatrist-patient rela'.

ship, there is an affirmative duty to prevent suicifu
ibid at page 110.

Plaintiff's exp'. rt witness,

Dr.~

Walker, III, testified at his deposition that "You ar
obliged to take the steps to prevent suicide, yes, ye
are."

Tr. 7 4 6.
The scope of the duty "is to exercise persc

ally or by means of orders and instructions to hospit
personnel, reasonable restraint and observation."

W

Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 16 Buffalo Law &
649, 666.

Of course, what is reasonable in each ca~
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depends on the psychiatric condition of the patient.
ibid.

In other words, the psychiatrist must at least

partially base his determination as to the course of
treatment the patient will receive on the foreseeability
that the patient will in some manner harm himself.

D.

Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists (1973).
Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. C. H. Hardin Branch,
testified at his deposition on August 4, 1977, that Mr.
Farrow's psychiatric condition was such that it justified
more protection than he was given in this situation.
Trial 867.

Plus, defendant Louis G. Moench, as reflected

in his Consultation Report, recognized that plaintiff was
a hazard to himself.

Clearly, there was at least a jury

question on whether or not Dr. Moench fulfilled his
duty to the plaintiff based on Mr. Farrow's psychiatric
state.

However, that question was never considered by

the jury because the effect of instruction No. 19 was to
grant the defendants a directed verdict if the jury found
that the plaintiff "intentionally jumped from the window
in an attempt to commit suicide."

The instruction was

thus erroneous because the jury was told that an irrational act by the plaintiff, with no qualifying instructions
as to foreseeability of that act and as to Dr. Moench's
duty to protect the plaintiff from that act, will relieve
the defendant of any liability.

The law is that a physi-
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cian has a duty to safeguard his patients against

a~

due to mental incapacity by exercising personally, m
means of orders and instructions to hospital personnE
reasonable restraint and observation and the jury

s~

have been instructed to that effect.
The impact and effect of the intentional ac
instruction is magnified by instruction 20 relatingt
proximate cause.

(This instruction is not a good st

ment of proximate cause and unduly emphasizes the cor.
There is an earlier instruction covering the subject.
Here the jury is told that even if they find Dr. Moer.
negligent, nonetheless, he would not be liable is his
negligence did not cause the event when the jury

co~

sidered these two instructions together, they could1
have found Dr. Moench negligent; but have further foo
that plaintiff intentionally jumped from the window;
therefore, plaintiff could not recover.

The theorys

forth by the court in the two instructions is erronec
Even further, the wording of the two instructions is
couched in such manner that the jury had no choice u
thus, the court, in essence, directed a verdict agah
plaintiff.
Accordingly, this case must be remanded fm
new trial.
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POINT III:

THE JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE LOCALITY
RULE, UNDER WHICH THE OPINIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S
EXPERT WITNESS WERE NOT ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE
AND WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE STANDARD OF
CARE INSTRUCTION GIVEN THE JURY, IS A LEGAL
ANACHRONISM AND MUST BE REJECTED AS THE
RULE OF LAW IN UTAH.
On Tuesday, July 27, 1976, defendants deposed

plaintiff's expert witness, Sydney Walker, III, M.D., a
specialist in neuropsychiatry.

Prior to the deposition,

Dr. Walker had personally examined the plaintiff, reviewed the LDS Hospital records that pertained to the
plaintiff, examined plaintiff's records from the San
Diego Veterans Administration Hospital, and reviewed
the depositions of Karen Pool, Dr. Louis G. Moench, Craig
Jackson, Betty Farrow, John K. Griffiths, Julie Ann
Hanson, Dr. Louis J. Schricker, Diane Karren, and of the
plaintiff,
of Sydney

Chester Farrow.
Walke~,

III.)

(Pages 17 and 18, deposition

At this deposition, Dr. Walker

testified that in his opinion defendant Health Services
Corporation, defendant Louis G. Moench, M.D., and defendant Louis J. Schricker, M.D. failed to properly care
for the plaintiff, according to accepted standards of
medical care and that this failure to care for the
plaintiff resulted in his injuries.

The trial judge re-

fused to allow the opinions of Dr. Walker, as stated in
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his deposition, to be admitted into evidence because
had never practiced medicine in Utah, and thus, the
reasoning went, was incompetent to testify as to the
medical standard of care in this state.
The 11th instruction the court read to the ju:
stated:
"You are instructed that if you find that
the defendant Dr. Moench, in prescribing the
drug Mellaril to treat the plaintiff's
psychosis and the drug Dalmane for sleeping
and instructing the nurse to repeatedly
reassure the plaintiff by direct contact
consisting of entering his room and standing
by his bed while talking to him, complied
with accepted standards of psychiatric care
in this community, you should return a
verdict in favor of the defendant."
Instruction 11, insofar as it makes the applicable standard of care against which Dr. Moench's
conduct was to be judged, that of accepted standards1
psychiatric care "in this community"

(emphasis added),

correctly states the Utah position regarding the
cality rule".

"l~

That position is this:

"In malpractice cases, whether a physician
or surgeon is negligent in the treatment
of a patient depends upon whether he has
used or failed to use the ordinarv care and
skill required of doctors in the community
which he serves." Anderson v Nixon, 104
Utah 262, 139 P2d 216, 218.
As a rule of law, the locality rule is out of touch wi
medical reality.
The root of the locality rule goes back to th'
19th Century and is found in cases such as Small v. H
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128 Mass. 131, 35 Am Rep. 363 (1880).

(Overruled by

Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 NE2d 703 (1968).)

At that time,

long before the advent of the automobile, the airplane,
radio or television, persons were admitted to medical
.school if they had a high school diploma or its equivalent.

Upon gradutaion, the practitioner was given an

M.D. Degree and turned loose upon the world, in most
cases never again to see the inside of a medical school
classroom or be brought up to date on the latest developments of medical care.

Obtaining a license to practice

medicine was a formality.
171 SE2d 393 (1970).

Wiggins v. Piver, 276 NC 134,

Transportation and communication

systems were primitive.

"Then, except for a few stops

on the railroads, the quickest mode of travel was by
'coach and four'.

Forty miles between sunup and sundown

was a full days travel--less than fifty minutes will
suffice today."

171 SE2d at 396-397.

With this state of affairs the courts quite
rightly felt that it was unjust to apply the same standard of care to city doctors and to their country cousins.
Circumstances, to coin a phrase, have changed.
Travel times that used to be measured in days and weeks
are now calculated in terms of hours.

A doctor can pick

up a telephone in Salt Lake City and speak with a colleague in Boston at a cost of a few dollars.

"New
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techniques and discoveries are available to all doctru
within a short period of time through medical

journa~

closed circuit television presentations, special radh
networks for doctors, tape recorded digests of medical
literature, and current correspondence courses."

Nob

An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of
Care, 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 729, 732.

There havet

great improvements in the quality of medical schools;
those accepted for admittance thereto.

In addition,

t

states have toughened up their licensing requirements
for doctors.

Note - Negligence - Medical

Malpracti~

The Locality Rule, 18 De Paul Law Review 328.

The St

of Utah now requires all physicians and surgeons to he
a degree from a medical school approved by the Deparu
of Business Regulation, to have successfully complete(
twelve months of hospital internship training,
pass an examination in anatomy, hist0logy,
biochemistry, pathology and physiology.

and~

bacteriol~

(Sections•

31 and Section 58-27-6 Utah Code Ann.)
The reason for the foregoing historical bm
ground is to show that the conditions that led to a di
ference in the standard of medical care from one plaa
another no longer exist.

In fact, at least within m~

specialties, the standard of medical care is uniform
throughout the country .
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In 1962 the Stanford Law Review conducted a
survey of the practice of medicine by specialists practicing within their specialities.

Its conclusion:

The

practice of medicine by physicians within their medical
specialities is similar throughout the nation.

Medical

Specialities and the Locality Rule, 14 Stanford Law Review 884.
The locality rule has several very real and
practical difficulties which serve to wreak manifest injustice upon those unfortunate enough to be injured by a
doctor's or hospital's negligence:
First, professional people are reluctant to
testify against their colleagues in the community, Pederson
v. Dumochel, 431 P2d 973, Wash.

(1967).

In point of fact,

plaintiff's attorney in this case contacted a number of
doctors in Utah to solicit (1) their opinion regarding
possible liability on the part of the defendants and (2)
testimony in line with their opinions.

They believed that

there was liability but refused to testify.

Tr. 155.

Second, "the possibility of a small group who,
by their laxness or carelessness could establish a local
s.tandard of care that was below that which the law requires."

431 P2d at 977;
Third, since the locality rule dictates that

the standard of care be that of other doctors in the
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community, the plaintiff is barred from bringing in
expert witnesses from outside the community because,.
reasoning goes, not being familiar with the

situati~

in the community, he is not competent to testify ast
the standard of medical care.

This is in total

dis~

gard of the fact that, at least as far as specialisb
there is no difference in the standard of medical

c~

from community to community and in disregard of thef
that the defendant may be an acknowledged expert inl
field who has access to the latest developments in &
field of medicine.

Such is the case here.

Defendant Louis G. Schricker has a bachelor.
degree, an M.D. degree and spent almost six and

one~

years as an intern/resident before being certified
American Board of Neurological surgery.

~

For almost f,

years Dr. Schricker was Chief of Neurologic Surgeryi
Fitzsimmons Army Hospital in Denver, Colorado.

Tr. l'

Since 1957 he has been an associate professor of new
logic surgery at the University of Utah College of Me
cine.

(Deposition of Dr. Louis J. Schricker, page 5.

Defendant Louis G. Moench is a Phi Beta Kappa and a
graduate of the University of Chicago Medical School,
diplomate of the American Board of Internal Medicine<
for a period of six years a preceptor under the vice

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.54.

chairman of the American Board of Internal Medicine.

Dr.

Moench received post-graduate training in psychiatry in
McLain Hospital, the University of California at San
Francisco and the Utah State Hospital in Provo.

Tr. 1856.

He currently is an associate clinical professor at the
University of Utah School of Medicine,

(Deposition of

Louis G. Moench, page 3.) having been associated with the
medical school since 1945 in the departments of Medicine
and Psychiatry.

Tr. 1857.

In addition, at Dr. Schricker's deposition he
stated that there are several excellent medical libraries
in Salt Lake City, including one at the LOS Hospital and
one at the University of Utah.

(Deposition of Louis

J. Schricker, page 9.)
Defendant Health Services Corporation, formerly known as LOS Hospital, is affiliated with the
University .,f Utah Medical School as a teaching hospital.
The outstanding credentials of the defendants
in this case highlight the unreasonableness of refusing
the testimony of specialists from outside Salt Lake City
because of a rule which was designed to protect the poorly
trained, poorly equipped practitioner of the healing
arts who did not have access to the latest advancements
in medical care.
The argument against the Utah locality rule is now
complete.

Its origins are in the days when Utah had not even
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achieved statehood.

In the time between then and now

there have been vast improvements in the quality of m,
cal education, medical students, post-graduate
and continuing education.

trai~

~

In the interim has come

automobile, the airplane, radio, television, and tele·
phone.

~f

The states now rigorously test physicians

allowing them to practice within their boundaries.

1

the locality rule is the law, unless the plaintiff is
able to convince the trial judge that res ipsa loquil
should apply, the injured party is effectively

cut~

from seeking redress of his grievances in the courts
to an inability to produce a "qualified" expert witne
to testify as to the standard of medical care in the
community.
In line with the above reasoning, seven st
in the last eleven years have rejected the localityr
as the statement of the standard of care in medical
malpractice cases:
chusetts;

4

Iowa;

1

Kentucky;

2

Maryland;

North Carolina; 5 Washington 6 and

3

Mass

Wiscons~

1

2
Speed v. State, 249 NW2d 901, (1976);
Blair v. Er
3
461 SW2d 370, (1970);
Shilkret v Anapolis Hospital

Association, 276 Md., 349 Atlantic 2d 245 (1975); ~
v. Belinkoff, 235 NE2d 793 (1968); 5 Wiggins v. Pi~

4

N.C. 134, 171 SE2d 393 (1970); 6 Pederson v. oumo~
7
P2d 973 (1967);
Shier v. Freeman, 58 Wis. 2d 269,1
166 (1973).
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.

Three states have rejected the locality rule
as the statement of the standard of care a specialist
. pa t 'ien t :
owes h is

8 M· h ·
Arizona;
.
ic igan; 9 and Minnesota. 10

Three states have rejected the locality rule
as the statement of the standard of care for hospitals:
11
12
Iowa;
Washington;
and Maryland. 13
Although the Restatement Second of Torts,
Section 299 A reflects a modified locality rule in that
it would require a professional to exercise "the skill
and knowledge normally possessed by members of the profession or trade in good standing in similar communities",
"Comment d. Special Representation.", states that if an
actor holds himself out as a specialist he should be
held to possess the skill and knowledge of other specialists in that trade.

The conunent specifically includes

physicians and states, "Thus a physician who holds himself out as a specialist in certain

ty~es

of practice is

required to have the skill and knowledge common to other
specialists."

8 Kronkee v Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P2d 156 (1972);
9
10
Christy v Saliterman, 179 NW2d 288 (1970);
Naccarato
11
v Grob, 348 Mich. 248, 180 NW2d 788 (1970);
Dickinson
v Mailliard, 175 NW2d 588, 36 ALR 3d 425 (1970);
12 Pederson v Dumochel, Supra; 13 Shilkret v Anapolis
Hospital Association, Supra .
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The sole issue remaining is what should
standard of care once the locality rule has been

~

ab~

Plaintiff favors the formulation of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin-- "The jury should be told in

substan~:

a qualified medical (or dental) practitioner, be hea
subje~

general practitioner or a specialist, should be

to liability in an action for negligence if he fails·
exercise that degree of care and skill which is exerr
by the average practitioner in the class to which he:
longs, acting in the same or similar circumstances. r
graphical area and its attendent lack of facilities a:
circumstances that can be considered if appropriate."
Shier v Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 266 NW2d 166, 174 (:
This statement of the standard accurately reflects ili
realities of medical care in the United States

tod~.

eliminates the injustice that is part and parcel oft
locality rule yet allows consideration of the

defen~

inability to keep up with advances in medical care h
rare case where that may be a factor.
Accordingly, the only conceivable course~
this Court to follow is to overrule the locality

ru~

in Utah, adopt the standard that most accurately re·
fleets the realities of medical practice in the UniW
States today, and remand this case to the trial court
for a new trial.
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POINT IV:

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JURY VERDICT FOR
DR. MOENCH MUST BE REVERSED AND ON THE RETRIAL OF THIS ACTION, THE LOWER COURT MUST
BE DIRECTED TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS JOINTLY.
One of the basic principles of the medical

community in this day and age is the concept of "team
care".

No one medical person provides for all the medi-

cal needs of the patient.

Each team or group interacts

with the other and all share credit for the medical suecess.

However, when a failure occurs the team breaks

apart and each stands separate and points to the other
or others as being the weak link in the medical care
chain.
That has occurred in this case.

The attending

surgeon says the operation was a success and that his
responsibility for the patient terminated after he turned
the patient over to the psychiatrist.

(Albeit two and

one-half days after the problem was brought to his attention by the psychiatric social worker.)

Dr. Moench,

on the other hand, says that Farrow was not his patient
and that he was merely called in for a consultation.
(He did, however, order immediate medication and a doctor
can only do that if a doctor/patient relationship exists.)
The hospital then says that Dr. Moench was not
precise in his orders and directions, e.g. "how many
times an hour is direct nurse contact" and "repeated
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reassurance."
Dr. Moench then says that he ordered somet
beyond the routine custodial care that was afforded
Farrow and testified that such care was available in
the hospital.

Tr. 1271, 1280.

The hospital replies

through Dr. Charles R. Smart who is an employee of t
hospital and Chief of Surgery.

Initially, Dr. Smart

filed an affidavit in this case in support of the ho:
pital's motion for summary judgment.

Tr. 231.

Para:

6 of the affidavit states:
"6.
In the setting of a hospital giving
general nursing care, as was the situatim
in this case, it would be unreasonable fru
the medical staff to request or expect mon
frequent contacts than were afforded the
plaintiff Farrow on the evening of August:
and early morning of August 24, 1974. It is
my opinion that the frequency and content
of the nursing contacts afforded to Chest~
E. Farrow on the evening of August 23 and
early morning of August 24, 1974, were in
compliance with reasonably prudent nursing
care on a neurosurgical ward in the Salt
:r.ake City, Utah, vicinity."
Dr. Smart was called as a witness for the
plaintiff during the course of trial for the purpose
of developing that statement he made in his depositk
At this point, the hospital was out of the case andb
tried every way to back away from that statement unti
finally the court allowed counsel to confront him ~t
paragraph 6 of his affidavit.

Dr. Moench ordered mor
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than general care; the hospital did not provide it; and
Dr. Smart testified that it would be unreasonable for
Dr. Moench to expect it.

Tr. 1273, Tr. 1583.

Exhibit

D-1.
The hospital, through its affidavits, etc.,
says that it reasonably complied with the medication
orders of Dr. Moench.

Dr. Moench, through counsel's

closing argument replied:

Tr. 1994.

" ... Now, the hospital isn't here to defend
itself; it isn't sued in this case, but I
suggest to you when the doctor orders Mellaril stat and even if you allow a one-half
hour leeway, it surely means that it ought
to be done before 10:00, it ought to be done
by 8:30 ... Now, if it had been given at 8:30
and the peak at 12:30 had not produced any
results, if the fellow was still having the
same kind of problems as evidenced earlier,
the nurse would then have had the opportunity
to give him SO more, if in her judgment he
needed it ... and if that had been done around
12:30, quarter to one, that also would have
begun to take effect, because it begins in
a half an hour. So by 2:40 there would have
been the cumulative effect of all that medicine.
I suggest to you that if that had been
done, we would not be here ..• "
(Mr. Snow)
Everyone who has ever defended a tort lawsuit
knows that the most successful defense is to place blame
on an absent, third party.

That is precisely what has

happened to the plaintiff at the first trial.
It is imperative that the summary judgment be
reversed, the jury verdict be reversed and that the entire
matter be remanded for new trial so that further injustice
to the plaintiff will be prevented.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erroneously granted summar
judgment in favor of Dr. Schricker and the LOS Hospi
Dr. Schricker failed in his responsibilities to Farr
by not timely recognizing that Farrow had become pcy
tic; taking inunediate steps to protect him; changeh
environment; and secure the services of a specialist
His negligence was a question for the jury.
The extensive fingers of the hospital will
be cataloged again.

It will suffice here to say tha:

the hospital knew early in the confinement that
needed and failed to secure that help.
finally arrived, Mr. Farrow was not
chiatrist ordered and not medicated.

Then

w~tched

he~

when~

as

It does

the~
not~

an expert to know that negligence is present on thef
of the hospital and that it must be submitted to a j<
The jury verdict in favor of Dr. Moench mw
be reversed.

He clearly failed to carry out the duey

imposed upon a psychiatrist and in particular:
1.

The locality rule must be revised so

that the opinion of Dr. Walker can be admitted in evi
2.

The instructions to the jury relatingt

intentional acts is an incorrect statement of the d~
imposed upon a psychiatrist and was tantamount to a
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directed verdict in his favor.

(A psychiatrist and

hospital have a duty to take reasonable measures to
prevent intentional acts.)
It must be apparent to the Court that the
medical community enjoys tremendous advantages in malpractice cases.

First of all, local doctors will not

testify against their colleagues and when out of state
help is brought into the case, they are frequently prevented from testifying by reason of the locality rule.
It is a statistical fact that with one or two exceptions
the medical community has never lost a malpractice case
in the courts of this state.

Our courts should stop ac-

cepting the subtle and pervasive propaganda put out by
the medical rommunity and send this case back with new
guidelines so that simple and evenhanded justice will be
restored between litigants in this case and in whole
field of malpractice.

4d;.rrett
Brigham E. Roberts
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